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Abstract
Evolutionary spatial 2× 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using
different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their
nearest neighbors 2×2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two param-
eteres. Each agent is governed by a binary Markovian strategy (BMS) specified by 4
conditional probabilities [pR, pS, pT , pP ] that take values 0 or 1. The initial configu-
ration consists in a random assignment of ”strategists” among the 24 = 16 possible
BMS. The system then evolves within strategy space according to the simple stan-
dard rule: each agent copies the strategy of the neighbor who got the highest payoff.
Besides on the payoff matrix, the dominant strategy -and the degree of cooperation-
depend on i) the type of the neighborhood (von Neumann or Moore); ii) the way
the cooperation state is actualized (deterministically or stochastichally); and iii) the
amount of noise measured by a parameter ǫ. However a robust winner strategy is
[1,0,1,1].
Key words:
Complex adaptive systems, Agent-based models, Evolutionary Game Theory
PACS:
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.20.-a, 89.65.Gh, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge
1 Introduction
2×2 non cooperative games consist in two players each confronting two choices:
cooperate (C) or defect (D) and each makes its choice withoutknowing what
the other will do. The four possible outcomes for the interaction of both agents
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are: 1) they can both cooperate (C,C) 2) both defect (D,D), 3) one of them
cooperate and the other defect (C,D) or (D,C). Depending on the case 1)-
3), the agent gets respectively : the ”reward” R, the ”punishment” P or the
”sucker’s payoff” S the agent who plays C and the ”temptation to defect” T
the agent who plays D. One can assign a payoff matrix M given by
M =
(
(R,R) (S, T )
(T, S) (P, P )
)
,
which summarizes the payoffs for row actions when confronting with column
actions.
The paradigmatic non zero sum game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). For the
PD the four payoffs obey the relations: T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T 1 .
Clearly in the case of the PD game it always pays more to defect independently
of what your opponent does: if it plays D you can got either P (playing D) or
S (playing C) and if it plays C you can got either T (playing D) or R (playing
C). Hence defection D yields is the dominant strategy for rational agents. The
dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated: both
players get P which is smaller than R. A possible way out for this dilemma
is to play the game repeatedly. In this iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD),
players meet several times and provided they remember the result of previous
encounters, more complicated strategies than just the unconditional C or D
are possible. Some of this conditional strategies outperform the dominant one-
shot strategy, ”always D”, and lead to some non-null degree of cooperation.
The problem of cooperation is often approached from a Darwinian evolution-
ary perspective: diverse strategies are let to compete and the most successful
propagate displacing the others. The evolutionary game theory, originated as
an application of the mathematical theory of games to biological issues [1],
[2], later spread to economics and social sciences [3].
The evolution of cooperation in IPD simulations may be understood in terms
of different mechanisms based on different factors. Among the possible solu-
tions a very popular one regards reciprocity as the crucial property for a winner
strategy. This was the moral of the strategic tournaments organized by in the
early eighties by Axelrod [4],[3]. He requested submissions from several spe-
cialists in game theory from various disciplines. He played first the strategies
against each other in a round robin tournament, and averaged their scores.
The champion strategy was Tit for Tat (TFT): cooperate on the first move,
and then cooperate or defect exactly as your opponent did on the preced-
ing encounter. Then he evaluated these strategies by using genetic algorithms
1 The last condition is required in order that the average utilities for each agent of
a cooperative pair (R) are greater than the average utilities for a pair exploitative-
exploiter ((R+ S)/2).
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that mimic biological evolution. That is, the starting point is a population of
strategies, with one representative of each ’species’, or competitor. If a strat-
egy performed well, in the next generation it would be represented more than
once, and if a strategy did poorly, it would die off. Again, TFT dominated in
most of these ”ecological” tournaments. Axelrod identified as key features for
the success of TFT, besides nicety (it began playing C in the first move and
never is the first to defect on an opponent), two facets of reciprocity, namely:
a) it retaliates, meaning that it did not ignore defection but responded in kind,
and b) forgiving, meaning that it would resume cooperation if its opponent
made just one move in that direction.
Afterwards another ecological computer tournament was carried out by Nowak
and Sigmund [5], where the initial competing strategies were selected as fol-
lows. They described a strategy by four conditional probabilities: [pR,pS,pT ,pP ]
that determine, respectively, the probability that the strategy play C after
receiving the payoff R, S, T , or P . To simulate genetic drift they allowed ’mu-
tations’i.e. the replacement of a given strategy by another random strategy
in each round with a small probability p. In addition they consider a noisy
background, parameterized by ǫ to better model imperfect communication in
nature. In this simulation, a different strategy was found to be the most sta-
ble in the evolutionary sense. This strategy was approximately [1,0,0,1]. It had
previously been named simpleton by Rapoport and Chammah [6] and later
Pavlov by mathematicians D. and V. Kraines [7], because if its action results
in a high payoff (T or R) it stays, but otherwise it changes its action. Unlike
TFT, it cannot invade the strategy All D, given by [0,0,0,0], and like GTFT
(Generous TFT, an strategy that is close to TFT but has an appreciable value
of pS) it is tolerant of mistakes in communication. The main advantage of this
’win-stay lose-shift’ strategy is that it cannot be invaded by a gradual drift of
organisms close to All D, unlike TFT, since after a single mistake in commu-
nication Pavlov is tempted to defect (pT = 0) and will exploit the generous
co-operator. This keeps the population resistant to attack by All D.
On the other hand, the spatial structure by itself has also been identified as
sufficient element to build cooperation. That is, unconditional players (who
always play C or D no matter what their opponents play) without memory
and no strategical elaboration can attain sustainable cooperation when placed
in a two dimensional array and playing only against their nearest neighbors
[8].
The combination of the two above elements that are known to promote co-
operation, iterated competition of different conditional strategies and spatial
structure, was first studied in [9] using m-step memory strategies. Later on,
Brauchli et al [10] studied the strategy space of all stochastic strategies with
one-step memory. Here, our approach is in a similar vein: we have a cellular
automata (CA) and attached to each cell a strategy, specified by a 4-tuple of
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conditional probabilities, that dictates how to play (C or D) against its neigh-
bors. However, in order to provide a greater ”microscopic” insight than just
the four average values of the conditional probabilities (as is the case when
continuous real conditional probabilities are considered), we resort to binary
Markovian strategies (BMS). That is, conditional probabilities pX of playing
C after getting the payoff X that are either 0 or 1, instead of real. There are
thus only 24=16 possible BMS whose frequencies can be measured. Another
simplification we introduced is that at each time step a given agent plays the
same action (C or D) against all its neighbors and takes account only its to-
tal payoff, collected by playing against them, instead of keeping track of each
individual payoff. Then depending if its neighborhood was ”cooperative” or
not (different possibilities to assess this are proposed in section 3) and what
it played, it adopts action C or D against all its neighbors. Therefore, we
have a CA such that each cell has a given state which is updated taking into
account both this state and the outer total corresponding to the rest of the
neighborhood. Or in the language of cellular automata, an i.e. outer totalistic
CA [11]. We choose totalistic CA because, besides their simplicity and their
known properties of symmetry [12], the results show greater robustness being
less dependent on the initial configuration.
Besides deterministic automata, we explore two sources of stochastic behavior:
Firstly in the update rule, specifically in the criterion to assess if the neighbor-
hood is cooperating or not. Secondly, by introducing a (small) noise parameter
ǫ and replacing the values of the conditional probabilities pX , 0 or 1, by ǫ, 1-ǫ,
respectivelly.
In summary, we analyze the evolution in the strategy space that occur for
different:
• 2× 2 games i.e. different regions in the parameters space.
• Types of neighborhood: von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods.
• Update rules: deterministic and stochastic.
• Amounts of noise, measured by a parameter ǫ.
This paper is organized as follows. We begin in section 2 by briefly reviewing
some useful 2 × 2 games in Biology and Social Sciences. We then present a
two entries 16 × 16 table for the pairwise confrontation of BMS, whose cells
represent the asymptotic (after a transient) average payoff of row strategy
when playing against the column one. In section 3, we describe our model and
its variants. Next, in section 4, we present the main results. Finally, section 5
is devoted to discussion and final remarks.
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2 The strategic tournament between Markovian strategies in 2× 2
non-zero sum games
A change in the rank order of the 4 payoffs gives rise to games different from
the PD. Some of them are well studied games in biological or social sciences
contexts. We will comment on some of them.
Fig. 1. Winners matrix - 16 × 16 strategies. (a): Games with T > S, Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Chicken, etc; (b): Games with T < S, Hero and Battle of Sexes, Deadlock
game, etc. Color coding: White = row wins over column, Black (inverse) and Gray =
tie. The number reference for each of the 16 possible binary 4-tuples, [pR, pS, pT , pP ]
is given by binary number represented by the 4-tuple plus 1, i.e.: No. of strategy
= 8pR + 4pS + 2pT + pP + 1; (c)the 12 different possible 2 × 2 games marked as
zones in the parameters space.
For instance, when the damage from mutual defection in the PD is increased so
that it finally exceeds the damage suffered by being exploited: T > R > S > P
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the new game is called the chicken or Hawk-Dove (H-D) game. Chicken is
named after the car racing game. Two cars drive towards each other for an
apparent head-on collision. Each player can swerve to avoid the crash (cooper-
ate) or keep going (defect). This game applies thus to situations such that mu-
tual defection is the worst possible outcome (hence an unstable equilibrium).
The ’Hawk’ and ’Dove’ allude to the two alternative behaviors displayed by
animals in confrontation: hawks are expected to fight for a resource and will
injure or kill their opponents, doves, on the other hand, only bluff and do not
engage in fights to the death. So an encounter between two hawks, in general,
produce the worst payoff for both.
When the reward of mutual cooperation in the chicken game is decreased so
that it finally drops below the losses from being exploited: T > S > R > P
it transforms into the Leader game. The name of the game stems from the
following every day life situation: Two car drivers want to enter a crowded
one-way road from opposite sides, if a small gap occurs in the line of the
passing cars, it is preferable that one of them take the lead and enter into
the gap instead of that both wait until a large gap occurs and allows both to
enter simultaneously. When S in the Leader game increases so that it finally
surpasses the temptation to defect i.e. S > T > R > P the game becomes
the Hero game alluding to an ”Heroic” partner that plays C against a non-
cooperative one.
Finally, a nowadays popular game in social sciences is the Stag Hunt game,
corresponding to the payoffs rank order R > T > P > S i.e. when the
reward R for mutual cooperation in the PD games surpasses the temptation
T to defect. The name of the game derives from a metaphor invented by the
French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau: Two hunters can either jointly
hunt a stag or individually hunt a rabbit. Hunting stags is quite challenging
and requires mutual cooperation. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of
success is minimal. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a
lot of trust among its members.
Figure 1 (c) reproduces the plot of the parameter space for the 12 different
rank orderings of 2 × 2 games with R = 1, P = 0, from ref. [14]. Each game
refers to a region in the S, T-plane depicted: 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma; 2 Chicken,
Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift game; 3 Leader; 4 Battle of the Sexes; 5 Stag Hunt;
6 Harmony; 12 Deadlock; all other regions are less interesting and have not
been named.
Let us consider now the tournament between BMS, in which each particular
BMS plays repeatedly against all the BMS. We then number the 16 strategies
from 1 to 16 as follows. We asign to the binary 4-tuple [pR, pS, pT , pP ], specify-
ing a strategy, the corresponding binary number # represented by this 4-tuple
plus 1, i.e. # = 8pR+4pS +2pT + pP +1. It turns out that the repeated game
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between any pair of strategies is cyclic: after some few rounds both strate-
gies come back to their original moves. For example, suppose strategy # 3
([0,0,1,0]) playing against strategy # 9 ([1,0,0,1]). The starting movements
are irrelevant, and let’s choose # 3 playing C and # 9 playing D. The se-
quence of movements would then be: [C,D] → [D,D] → [D,C] → [C,D] i.e.
we recover the initial state after 3 rounds. The cycles, in these 16 × 16/2
confrontations, are either of period 1, 2, 3 or 4. Therefore, to compute the
average payoffs per round of any pair of strategies we have to sum the payoffs
over a number of rounds equal to the minimum common multiple of {1, 2, 3
& 4}, 12, and divide by it. This allows to construct a 16 × 16 matrix with
the average payoffs for row strategy playing against the column one for an
arbitrary set of payoffs {R, T, S, P}.
The average payoffs per round for strategies i and j playing one against the
other, can be written as uij = αijR + βijS + γijT + δijP and uji = αjiR +
βjiS + γjiT + δjiP , respectively, where αij is the probability that strategy i
gets the payoff R, βij is the probability to get the payoff S and so on. Because
of the symmetries of the payoff matrix M, αij = αji, δij = δji, βij = γji and
γij = βji, since strategies i and j receive R or P the same number of times,
and i (j) receives T when j (i) receives S. Hence, the difference uij − uji only
depends on whether T is below or over S. As a consequence, the matrix 1-(a)
representing the results of the 16×16 = 256 encounters: is the same for all the
other games with T > S. The same is true for 1-(b) representing the results
for all the games with T < S. In addition note the symmetry between both:
one is the ’negative’ of the other.
For each strategy we calculate Ui =
∑
j ui,j the total (sum over all the 16
possible contenders) average payoff of strategy i. The general results of this
calculation, as well as the particular numerical values when the four payoff are
{1.333, 1, 0.5 & 0} are listed in the table 1. For instance we have the PD game
when R = 1, T = 1.333, S = 0 and P = 0.5; the Chicken game when R = 1,
T = 1.333, S = 0.5 and P = 0 and so on. We observe that for these values of
the parameters, [1, 0, 0, 0] is the strategy with the highest average payoff for
PD and Stag Hunt, while [1, 1, 0, 1] is the strategy that has the highest value
of V for Chicken, Leader and Hero.
3 Binary Markovian Strategy Competition in an Outer Totalistic
Cellular Automata
Each agent is represented, at time step t, by a cell with center at (x, y) with
a binary behavioral variable c(x, y; t) that takes value 1 (0) if it is in the C
(D) state. At every time step a given cell plays pairwise a 2× 2 game against
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[pR, pS , pT , pP ] Asymptotic Average Payoff U PD Chicken Stag Hunt Leader Hero
[0, 0, 0, 0] 8(T + P ) 14.66 10.66 12.00 8.00 10.66
[0, 0, 0, 1] (55/24)R + (55/24)S + (41/6)T + (55/12)P 12.00 11.00 10.67 9.67 11.00
[0, 0, 1, 0] (55/24)R + (55/24)S + (55/12)T + (41/6)P 10.33 8.33 9.67 7.67 8.33
[0, 0, 1, 1] 4(R + S + T + P ) 11.33 11.33 11.33 11.33 11.33
[0, 1, 0, 0] 2S + 7T + 7P 12.83 10.33 10.50 9.67 11.33
[0, 1, 0, 1] (35/12)R + (61/12)S + (61/12)T + (35/12)P 9.67 11.17 8.67 12.67 12.67
[0, 1, 1, 0] (35/12)R + (61/12)S + (35/12)T + (61/12)P 7.17 7.17 7.17 9.67 8.67
[0, 1, 1, 1] (55/12)R + (41/6)S + (55/24)T + (55/24)P 7.67 9.67 8.33 12.00 10.67
[1, 0, 0, 0] 2R + 7T + 7P 14.83 11.33 13.17 8.00 10.33
[1, 0, 0, 1] (61/12)R + (35/12)S + (61/12)T + (35/12)P 12.67 12.67 12.67 10.17 11.17
[1, 0, 1, 0] (61/12)R + (35/12)S + (61/12)T + (35/12)P 10.17 8.67 11.17 7.17 7.17
[1, 0, 1, 1] (41/6)R + (55/12)S + (55/24)T + (55/24)P 9.67 10.67 11.0 10.33 9.67
[1, 1, 0, 0] 4(R + S + T + P ) 11.33 11.33 11.33 11.33 11.33
[1, 1, 0, 1] 7R + 7S + 2T 9.67 13.17 11.33 14.83 13.17
[1, 1, 1, 0] 7R + 7S + 2P 8.00 10.50 10.33 12.83 10.50
[1, 1, 1, 1] 8(R + S) 8.00 12.00 10.66 14.66 12.00
Table 1
Asymptotic Average Payoff for Different 2× 2 Games.
all of its neighbors collecting total utilities U(x, y; t) given by the sum of the
payoffs u(x, y; t) it gets against each neighbor.
We use a rescaled payoff matrix in which the 2nd best payoff X2nd is fixed to
1 and the worst payoff, X4th is fixed to 0. For example, the PD payoff matrix
is described by two parameters: T˜ , P˜ ; the chicken PA by T˜ and S˜, etc.
We consider two different neighborhoods N(x, y): a) the von Neumann neigh-
borhood (q = 4 neighbor cells, the cell above and below, right and left from a
given cell) and b) the Moore neighborhood (q = 8 neighbor cells: von Neumann
neighborhood + diagonals).
In the case of ordinary (non totalistic) CA the way the cell at (x, y) plays
against its neighbor at (x′, y′) is determined by a 4-tuple [pR(x, y; t), pS(x, y; t),
pT (x, y; t), pP (x, y; t)] that are the conditional probabilities that it plays C at
time t if it got at time t-1 u(x, y; t − 1) = R, T, S or P respectively. Here,
as we anticipated, we use a totalistic automata and then at each time step
every cell plays at once a definite action (C or D) against all its q (4 or 8)
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neighbors instead of playing individually against each neighbor. Hence, it is
necessary to extend the above conditional probabilities in such a way that
they take into account the neighborhood ”collective” state. In order to do so,
note that the conditional probabilities pR, pS , pT & pP can also be regarded
as, respectively, the probability of playing C after [C,C], [C,D], [D,C] & [D,D].
Then a natural way to extend these conditional probabilities is to consider
that ”the neighborhood plays C (D)” if the majority of its neighbors play C
(D), that is, if






is above or below 1/2. There are different ways to implement this. Let us
consider the following two variants, one in terms of a deterministic update
rule for the behavioral variable, and the other in terms of an stochastic update
rule.
• Deterministic update:
c(x, y; t+ 1) = c(x, y; t)[pRθ
+(qC(x, y; t)− q/2) + pSθ
+(q/2− qC(x, y; t)]+
(1− c(x, y; t))[pTθ
+(qC(x, y; t)− q/2) + pPθ
+(q/2− qC(x, y; t))],
(1)




1 if x > 0
0 if x ≤ 0
(2)
• Stochastic update:
c(x, y; t) = c(x, y; t− 1)qC(x, y; t− 1)pR(x, y; t)+
c(x, y; t)(1− qC(x, y; t− 1))pS(x, y; t)+
(1− c(x, y; t))qC(x, y; t)pT (x, y; t)+
(1− c(x, y; t− 1))(1− qC(x, y; t− 1))pP (x, y; t).
(3)
where the probability that the neighborhood plays C is equal to the fraction
qC(x, y; t) of C neighbors.
Finally, after updating its behavioral variable, each agent updates its four
conditional probabilities pX copying the ones of the individual belonging to
N˜(x, y) who got the maximum utilities.
In order to take into account errors in the behavior of agents we include a noise
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level by a parameter ǫ > 0 in such a way that the conditional probabilities pX
for each agent can take either the value ǫ or the value 1− ǫ.
We consider a square network with Nag = L × L agents and periodic bound-
ary conditions. We start from an initial configuration in which each agent is
assigned randomly a strategy in such a way that the 16 possible strategies are
randomly represented among the population of the Nag agents.
The results of this simulations, like the ones in references [10] are sensible to
random seed selection, so, to avoid such dependence, frequencies for the 16
BMS as a function of time are obtained by averaging over Nc simulations with
different random seeds.
In the next section we present the results for several different games.
4 Results
The results at this section correspond to averages over an ensemble of Nc =
100 different random initial conditions for 100× 100 lattices 2 . For all the
games, we study the time evolution of the average frequency for each of the
16 strategies i.e., the fraction of the L × L agents in the network that plays
with that given strategy.
4.1 Deterministic Prisoner’s Dilemma
First we see the deterministic PD for T˜ = 1.333 and P˜ = 0.5. Fig.2 shows the
frequencies for the 16 different BMS, for the q = 4 von Neumann neighbor-
hood. One can see that without noise (ǫ = 0) the system reaches quickly a
dynamic equilibrium state in which several of the 16 strategies are present. As
long as ǫ grows, the number of strategies decreases, and the diversity without
noise transforms into two surviving strategies: [0,0,1,0] and TFT ([1,0,1,0]).
Indeed, the results for ǫ = 0.1 correspond to some cases in which the whole
population ends with the strategy [0,0,1,0] and cases where the whole popu-
lation ends using TFT. But without coexistence of both strategies. This also
explains the lack of fluctuations in the results despite of the large value of the
noise parameter.
2 Results do not change substantially when the lattice size or the number of aver-
aged initial conditions is increased.
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Fig. 2. Frequencies for the 16 competing Binary Markovian Strategies (BMS) vs
the number of time steps for Deterministic Prisoner’s Dilemma with T˜ = 1.333,
P˜ = 0.5 and q = 4. The strategy [pR, pS , pT , pP ] references used in all the figures are
the following: [0, 0, 0, 0]=thick light gray dotted curve (ALLWAYS D), [0, 0, 0, 1]=
thin black dashed curve,[0, 0, 1, 0]= thick black dotted curve, [0, 0, 1, 1]= thick gray
dash-dotted curve, [0, 1, 0, 0]= thick gray dotted curve, [0, 1, 0, 1]= thin gray solid
curve, [0, 1, 1, 0]= thick black dash-dotted curve, [0, 1, 1, 1]= thin light gray solid
curve, [1, 0, 0, 0]= thick light gray dash-dotted curve, [1, 0, 0, 1]=thick black dashed
curve (PAVLOV), [1, 0, 1, 0]=thick light gray solid curve (TFT), [1, 0, 1, 1]=thick
black solid curve, [1, 1, 0, 0]= thick gray dashed curve, [1, 1, 0, 1]=thick light gray
dashed curve, [1, 1, 1, 0]= thick gray solid curve, and [1, 1, 1, 1]= thin black solid
curve (ALLWAYS C).
Results for the Moore neighborhood, q = 8, are different from those obtained
for the q = 4, as can be seen from Fig. 3.
Notice that for zero or a small noise amount of noise (ǫ ≤ 0.01) we have
two surviving strategies [0,0,1,1] and [1,0,1,1]. For ǫ = 0.1 a new competing
strategy, [0,1,1,0] appears, and agents distribute almost equally among this
strategy, [1,0,1,1], and [0,0,1,1]. Finally, for ǫ = 0.25, 100
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Fig. 3. Frequencies for the 16 competing BMS vs the number of time steps for
Deterministic Prisoner’s Dilemma with T˜ = 1.333, P˜ = 0.5 and q = 8. Color and
line style codes are the same than in Figure 2
4.2 Stochastic Version
For the stochastic version higher levels of noise (larger values of ǫ) are needed
in order to measure departures from the 0 noise situation. This is natural
since there is an intrinsic stochastic component in this case. Fig.4 is a plot of
each of the 16 frequencies vs time for the PD Stochastic game with q = 8.
For zero or small noise i.e. ǫ ≤ 0.01 the only strategy present is [0,0,1,1]. For
ǫ = 0.1 [0,0,1,1] is still the more abundant strategy, but now it coexists with
[0,1,1,0]. If the noise level is increased even more, the frequency of strategy
[1,0,1,1] starts to become non negligible, till for ǫ = 0.25 it controls 100% of
the population.
The average winning strategies are robust for both the stochastic and the
deterministic case with respect to the parameters T˜ , P˜ of PD payoff matrix,
even for T˜ = 2, as long as we are in the region of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game the behavior is qualitatively the same.
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Fig. 4. Frequencies for the 16 competing BMS vs the number of time steps for
Stochastic Prisoner’s Dilemma with T˜ = 1.333, P˜ = 0.5 and q = 8. Color and line
style codes are the same than in Figure 2.
4.3 Other Payoff Matrices
In this section we explore other games for the deterministic case. Let’s observe
first the effect of permuting the punishment and the sucker’s payoff i.e. tacking
S˜ = 0.5 > P˜ = 0 (Chicken game).
Results for q = 4 are plotted in Fig. (5). For all the considered values of values
of ǫ between 0 and 0.1, [1,0,1,1] is the dominant strategy. For small amounts
of noise, coexistence of 3 strategies: [1,0,1,1], [0,0,1,0] and TFT ( [1,0,1,0] ).
Finally, for ǫ = 0.1, strategy [1,0,1,1] turns to be completely dominant with a
frequency of 100 %.
The steady state results for q = 8 are different for small amounts of noise but
become qualitatively the same for moderates values of the noise parameter
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Fig. 5. Frequencies for the 16 competing BMS vs the number of time steps for
Deterministic Chicken Game with T˜ = 1.333, S˜ = 0.5 and q = 4. Color and line
style codes are the same than in Figure 2.
(ǫ ≃ 0.01), as can be seen from Fig. 6.
The results for the Leader deterministic game with q = 8 are plotted in Fig.
7. For the case without noise (ǫ = 0) we have a remarkable diversity of sur-
viving strategies. As ǫ grows this diversity transforms into only two surviving
strategies: [1,0,1,1] and [0,0,1,1], whose relative dominace is exchanged for the
large values of noise (ǫ = 0.1). Notice that the lack of random fluctuations
when ǫ = 0.1 (a relatively high noise parameter) in figure 7 is explained as
before because the averages correspond either to cases in which the whole
population selected [0,0,1,1] or [1,0,1,1] as their strategies, i.e.: there are no
coexisting strategies in the steady state.
Fig. 8 shows the results the Hero deterministic game with q = 8. For the case
without noise (ǫ = 0), we have two main strategies :[0,0,1,1] and [1,0,1,1].
For intermediate amounts of noise ǫ << 0.1, the strategy [1,0,1,1] takes over.
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Fig. 6. Frequencies for the 16 competing BMS vs the number of time steps for
Deterministic Chicken Game with T˜ = 1.333, S˜ = 0.5, and q = 8. Color and line
style codes are the same than in Figure 2.
Finally, for large amounts of noise (ǫ ≃ 0.1) we have a new winner strategy:
[1,0,0,1] (PAVLOV).
For the Stag Hunt game (not plotted here), the dominant strategy is always
[1,1,1,1] (ALLWAYS C), a result that can be explained because for this game
playing C pays back a lot.
5 Discussion
We developed a simple model to study evolutionary strategies in spatial 2 ×
2 games that provides more robust results than those from more complex
previous models [10]. We found few dominant strategies that appear repeatedly
for several different 2 × 2 games, and not only for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Comparing figures (2)-(8), we notice that 3 strategies -mainly [1,0,1,1] and less
often [0,0,1,0] and [0,0,1,1]- dominate for the different games, update rules and
noise levels. If we look for these strategies at Table 1, we observe that none of
them are ”winner” strategies in the non spatial games. That is, none of them
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Fig. 7. Frequencies for the 16 competing BMS vs the number of time steps for
Deterministic Leader Game with T˜ = 1.333, R˜ = 0.5 and q = 8. Color and line style
codes are the same than in Figure 2.
get the highest average payoff but just a mediocre one. So territoriality seems
to have a relevant effect on the evolution of strategies. Moreover, the departure
from the non spatial tournament becomes larger as the neighborhood size
grows.
Another important conclusion is that for a large enough level of noise the
diversity disappears and one ends with just one universal strategy ( mainly
[1,0,1,1] ) or at most two dominant but non coexisiting strategies.
The strategy [1,0,1,1] is particularly interesting because it is like a ”crossover”
between PAVLOV [1,0,0,1] and TFT [1,0,1,0], which are the 2 main strate-
gies that humans use when are engaged in social dilemma game experiments
[15],[16]. We baptized this strategy as the ”Non-Tempted Pavlov”.
From the different variations of our model, we found that the evolution of
more cooperative strategies (more conditional probabilities pX equal to 1) is
favored when:
• The size of the neighborhood is increased (q = 8 lead to dominant strategies
16
Fig. 8. Frequencies for the 16 competing BMS vs the number of time steps for
Deterministic Hero Game with S˜ = 1.333, R˜ = 0.5 and q = 8. Color and line style
codes are the same than in Figure 2.
with much no-null conditional probabilities than q = 4).
• The update rule version for c(x, y; t) after the agent at (x, y) played with
its q neighbors is deterministic.
• The amount of noise measured by ǫ increases.
Some issues that deserve further study is to use time integrated utilities in-
stead of the instantaneous utilities used here, also to analyze spatial patterns
(for instance, size and form of cooperative clusters and of winning strategy
clusters).
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